Why is secession difficult in well-established democracies? This question was the title of a well-known article by Stéphane Dion, former minister of the Canadian government who had an active role against the secession referendum of Québec in 1995. He was also the author of the three questions submitted to the Supreme Court of Canada that eventually resulted in the Clarity Act of 2000. Dion contended that in the context of well-established democracies the conditions for secession are unlikely to occur: the host state does not inspire fear to the secessionist unit as it is not hostile to the existence of minority nations, and on the other hand secession does not generate confidence enough among potential secessionists because of the uncertainties of independence. But Dion's approach and generally the theories emphasizing the difficulties of secession in democratic contexts usually understate the concept of 'well-established' and, more importantly, of 'full-fledged' democracies.
Theories of secession have usually put the burden of proof on the secessionists and not on the host state. The debates have focused on who is entitled to the right to self-determination and if this includes the right of creating a new state. Restrictive theories consider secession as the last remedy to solve problems of justice, such as violent and ilegal occupation of a formerly independent territory, or severe threats of ethnic cleansing. Other theories contend that an association of free individuals can decide to form an independent state, or that certain kinds of communities are entitled to exercise the right of self-determination, but generally speaking all of them focus on the requirements that have to be met by the potential secessionist unit to have a legitimate claim for secession.
However, the burden of proof must also be put on the state's response to secessionist claims. A full-fledged democracy cannot reject the possibility of a constitutional regulation of secession. For a democracy to be qualified as such, constitutional and legal procedures of consultation must be established to give voice to the citizenry, so they can express their political preferences even if this entails a process of secession. In fact, unilateral secessions usually indicate a democratic failure so the constitutional regulation of secession can protect the existing state preventing the legitimization of unilateral secession for those cases of long, unsolved demands of self-government, as it channels these demands through democratic means of consultation. The constitutional regulation of secession must be on the one hand difficult enough to prevent political opportunism, but on the other hand it must also establish fair requirements to allow well-stablished national movements to express democratic demands of self-determination.
Therefore, the regulation of secession must not only focus on the claims for self-government or self-determination by the secessionist unit, but also on the democratic response by the state. It is in fact a requirement for a state to qualify as a full-fledged democracy, and, in the case of Spain, it is probably the main challenge that has not accomplished yet, thirty years after the end of the Francoist regime.
Ivan Serrano
@aubachs
Ph.D. Political Science.
Open University of Catalonia.
Citizens' Voice Series
Few are the states that by Constitution allow for the secession of their parts. As a matter of fact, I cannot come up with any example.
But the onus should not be on me. It should be on the one who claims that such a provision is critical for democracy.
The esteemed doctor seems to forget very basic facts. A democracy is there for the citizens, not for groups of them. Ways to vent one's opinion are absolutely established. And ultimately if there is a group of citizens that opts for independence the threshold of not having any legal provision for it is just the right one: no democracy can be opposed to secession when this is presented as a fait accompli.
Above all, the burden of proof has to be entirely with those who want to change the status quo, because the status quo is based on an original agreement that needs no further justification. It has to be challenged. That's a bit like Newton's First Law of motion.
There is no way of succeeding by turning things upside down.
Tenim que defensar els drets de catalunya,a tot el mon.donar a coneixá nostra emprempta,moltes gracies per crear aquest blog.
Dear Candide,
I believe you start with a wrong premise: you wrote "because the status quo is based on an original agreement that needs no further justification".
In In the case of Catalonia, the original agreement does not exist. The union is based on the right of conquest, so as you say, no democracy can be opposed to secession, but the "Spanish democracy" does.
There has never been an agreement to live together, the union was based on arms and the subjugation of people.
So don't you believe that the Catalan people deserve the right to be heard at least once in history?
Dear Candide, Joan and srta Pepis,
thank you for your comments on the post, I didn't come up with them until today, so apologies for not having answered earlier.
Candide, you make an interesting point when you mention that few states do regulate secession, but in fact you missunderstand the constitutional regulation with the democratic one, that is, even a case of non explicit regulation -and the UK here is a case in point- can articulate democratic procedures for its citizens to express their political preferences. Theoretically, even the Spanish constitution could be ammended to introduce such arrangements, though it is unlikely. Conversely regulating secession at the constitutional level does not involve it is done under a democratic standard: f.i. the USSR actually akcnowledged this right).
A second flaw in your argument is to missunderstand the idea of citizen and group. Citizenship rights are by definition collective rights provided by an institution -the state- within a given border. I cannot expand on this topic here but there is as you can imagine a bunch of literature about it.
The third thing I would mention is that you mix unilateral and bilateral secessions, opposing democracy-to-democracy makes little sense, the question is precisely how to articulate democratic channels of citizen participation for such a relevant question as the creation of a new state is. Unilateral secessions are generally cases where at least one of the two actors involved -whether the state or the secessionist unit- do not follow democratic standards (from the procedures to the respect for human rights.
Please keep in mind that these remarks I make here -necessarily too short for space reasons have not to do with your political stance on the question but about some theoretical weaknesses I detect on your reasoning from a political theory perspective. As you can easily see from this post, I do not defend here neither Spanish unity nor Catalan secession, but the necessity for democratic response to articulate citizens political demands in a fair way.
Regards and thank you all for your comments!